Chapter 7:   DECISIONS AND DOCUMENTS

Section 5u:   Decisions to recommend appointments of Secretaries-General

 

UPDATED SECRETARY-GENERAL APPOINTMENT BACKGROUNDER

GA President sets schedule and modalities for interactive dialogues with candidates

 

Update: On 21 and 22 April 2026, interactive dialogues with each of the four candidates for Secretary-General nominated by 1 April were held according to the further modalities outlined by the Assembly President in her letters of 2 and 15 April sent to UN Member States and Permanent Observers. An additional interactive dialogue will shortly be scheduled for the fifth candidate, who was nominated on 11 May. Webcasts of the four dialogues held in April can be found on this webpage: https://www.un.org/en/sg-selection-and-appointment

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The remainder of this article was posted on 15 April, prior to four interactive dialogues held between General Assembly members and the four candidates who had been nominated prior to 1 April, with civil society participation as well. The artilce details both the modalities followed for the dialogues and the subsequent steps of the appointment process still remaining to be carried out on the way to appointing the next Secretary-General. In addition to the four candidates mentioned in the article, on 11 May, María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés of Ecuador was nominated by Antigua and Barbuda. With respect to her fundingdisclosure, the letter of nomination states that her campaign expensses "will be financed through a combination of the candidate’s personal resources, voluntary contributions, and support provided in accordance with applicable national regulations and established United Nations practices." The other candidates' funding disclosures are reproduced below in Section 3.

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On 2 April 2026, the General Assembly President sent a letter informing all UN Member States and Permanent Observers of the timetable for the interactive dialogues which will be held with each candidate nominated for the position of Secretary-General. Two weeks later, on 15 April, the President followed up with a new letter conveying “additional information in preparation for the interactive dialogues”. These two April letters built on her letter dated 4 March, in which she initially set out in detail the modalities for conducting the interactive dialogues.[1] Taken together, all the Assembly President’s letters create a comprehensive and developed framework for the interactive dialogues in furtherance of the goal of helping to ensure that the appointment process will be “transparent and inclusive”.

 

As conveyed in the President’s 2 April letter, the Assembly’s interactive dialogues will be held on Tuesday, 21 April, and Wednesday, 22 April, with two sessions convening each day. The candidates will participate in the alphabetical order of their last names, as follows:

 

21 April, 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.: Michelle Bachelet Jeria of Chile (nominated by Brazil and Mexico)[2]

21 April, 3:00 to 6:00 p.m.: Rafael Mariano Grossi of Argentina (nominated by Argentina)

22 April, 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.: Rebeca Grynspan Mayufis of Costa Rica (nominated by Costa Rica)

22 April, 3:00 to 6:00 p.m.: Macky Sall of Senegal (nominated by Burundi)

 

Each interactive dialogue will be webcast, and all will be held in the Trusteeship Council Chamber rather than the General Assembly Hall.[3]

 

Overall, there will be considerable continuity from the 2016 interactive dialogues to those of 2026. Nonetheless, as outlined by the Assembly President, the 2026 process will include four significant advances over the arrangements of ten years ago.[4]

 

First, during the 2016 interactive dialogues, each candidate was accorded two hours during which to present their vision statement, make opening remarks, and respond to questions. In actuality, the two-hour allotment proved inadequate for giving the floor to all Member State representatives who wished to ask questions, and for the candidates to respond with detailed answers. It also left limited time for queries from civil society. It is undoubtedly for these reasons that, as confirmed by the Assembly President’s March and April letters, the duration for the 2026 dialogues will be three hours.  

 

Second, while the 2016 arrangements provided guidelines for the vision statements of candidates, the then Assembly President did not set out a focus for the exchanges to take place at the interactive dialogues. Filling this gap, the present Assembly President’s March letter states that in the 2026 dialogues, questions to candidates

 

“should be structured around two thematic segments: 1) Proven leadership abilities, experience and skills for a strong and fit-for-the-future organization; 2) The three pillars of the United Nations: peace and security, development, and human rights.”

 

The President’s March letter bases this focus on the fact that the Assembly’s 2025 “Revitalization” resolution 79/327 ​highlights “the important role played by the Secretary-General in the context of current global challenges and in the implementation of the three pillars of the United Nations, namely peace and security, human rights and development”.[5] Interestingly, the Assembly President’s March letter moved “development” from being the third, to being the second pillar for the interactive dialogues. Also interesting is the fact that, as discussed in the section below on “Civil society participation”, civil society representatives have been given a list of topics for their questions which differs slightly from the one transmitted to Member States and Permanent Observers.

 

Third, in 2016, the format for the interactive dialogues was for the candidate to respond to questions “at regular intervals”.[4] For the 2026 dialogues, a candidate “will respond to each Member State’s or group’s questions immediately”.

 

And fourth, whereas at each of the 2016 dialogues, one-to-two civil society representatives were to be given the floor “time permitting”, the Assembly President’s 4 March 2026 communication states without qualification that “On each thematic segment, civil society will be given the opportunity to ask questions to the candidates.” (our emphasis) Further details regarding the engagement of civil society are set out in the section below entitled "Civil society participation".

 

Other modalities for the interactive dialogues, as set out in the Annex to the Assembly President’s March letter, include the following:

 

• Candidates will be invited to present an opening statement of up to 10 minutes to present their vision

 

• Opening statements will be followed by questions from Member States and civil society

 

• General Assembly seating protocol will apply

 

• The dialogues will be interpreted in all official languages and broadcast live on UN WebTV

 

• Instead of a pre-established list of speakers, Member States will request the floor by pressing the microphone button and will pose questions from their seats on a first-come, first-served basis

 

• Interventions on behalf of a group of States will be given priority

 

• Interventions will be limited to two minutes for interventions in a national capacity and three minutes for interventions on behalf of a group of States, and these time limits will be strictly enforced by automatic microphone cut-off[6]

 

• Candidates will respond to each Member State’s or group’s questions immediately, and are encouraged to limit their response to two minutes 

 

The Assembly President’s 15 April letter reconfirms many of these modalities, and outlines these additional points:

 

• The interactive dialogues will be held in two sequential, thematic segments. As already noted, the first will be on “Proven leadership abilities, experience and skills for a strong and fit-for-the-future organization”, and the second on “The three pillars of the United Nations: peace and security, development, and human rights.” After the first segment has concluded, for the second segment Member States or groups of States which did not speak in the first segment will be given priority.

 

• Member States are encouraged to pose short and focused questions

 

• Member States are encouraged to coordinate in advance to avoid any repetitive questions and ensure a truly interactive exchange

 

• Civil society questions will be interspersed with those from Member States

 

The Assembly President’s letters do not reprise the 2016 Assembly President’s encouragement that Member States’ representation at the interactive dialogues be at “ambassadorial level”. It is generally expected, nonetheless, that the Permanent Representatives of many States will be present.

 

As for interactions with the press, the Assembly President’s March 2026 letter states that each nominee will be offered the opportunity of a press stake-out following their interactive dialogue.

 

Participation of civil society

 

The General Assembly President has invited Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) “to express interest in asking a question to the candidates for their response during [the] interactive dialogues.”[7] Guidelines for this civil society participation have been posted on the webpage of the Civil Society Unit of the UN Department of Global Communications. With a deadline of 5 April, CSO representatives could register to participate in person or virtually. Further, when registering, CSOs were requested to indicate “the thematic area(s) under which they intend to raise a question” and also “to submit the outline of the question in writing”.

 

Requests by CSOs to participate will be “reviewed with due regard to balanced thematic and stakeholder representation”. Which specific CSOs receive permission to ask questions – whether in person or remotely – will be decided through a lottery. The Civil Society Unit webpage does not indicate how many civil society questions will be taken during each interactive dialogue.

 

For those CSOs chosen to participate in person, “speaking time in the room will be limited to 60 seconds and strictly enforced through the use of automatic microphone cut-offs”. Virtual questions will be presented at the dialogues via pre-recorded videos, also with a time limit of 60 seconds.

 

Interestingly, the guidelines for the focus of civil society questions differ slightly from the guidelines provided to Member States and Permanent Observers. As noted above, States and Observers are to structure their questions 

 

“around two thematic segments: 1) Proven leadership abilities, experience and skills for a strong and fit-for-the-future organization; 2) The three pillars of the United Nations: peace and security, development, and human rights.” (our emphasis)

 

For CSOs, the DCG Civil Society Unit webpage states that questions “should be on the following categories:

 

• Proven leadership abilities, Experience and Skills of the candidates

• UN Reform / UN80 Reform initiative (our emphasis)

• Peace and Security

• Development

• Human Rights

 

As can be seen, the topic of “UN Reform / UN80 Reform initiative” was not included in the guidelines for Member States and Permanent Observers. In their guidelines, these topics are only more generally alluded to through reference to a “fit-for-the-future organization”.

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For detailed background on how the new appointment process has evolved since 2015, see the related article on this website. What follows here is a discussion of the modalities agreed so far with respect to the 2026 process, as well as a description of additional decisions which will need to be taken eventually to facilitate and complete the process.

  

1. Nomination procedures

 

Both resolution 79/327 and the Joint Letter of 25 November 2025 signed by the Assembly and Security Council Presidents confirmed an earlier decision by the Assembly that in order to be considered, each candidate must be nominated by at least one Member State. This decision closed a loophole which existed in the 2016 process, when there was uncertainty as to whether a candidate could be self-nominated. The resolution and letter also confirm that each Member State may nominate only one candidate. However, if that candidate is subsequently withdrawn, the Member may nominate another candidate.

 

While some Member States originally advocated setting a fixed deadline for nominations, ultimately neither the 2025 resolution nor the Joint Letter did so. However, in her January and March 2026 letters, the Assembly President forged new ground when she wrote that candidacy nominations “should be submitted . . . no later than 1 April 2026”. The President set out this indicative deadline while noting that it was “notwithstanding the Joint Letter”.

 

In both letters, the rationale given for setting a deadline was that it would “help the organization of interactive dialogues in the General Assembly with all candidates”. At least in part, the Assembly President may have been prompted to establish this deadline because during the previous competitive Secretary-General appointment process of 2016, only seven of the eventual thirteen candidates had been nominated by 1 April. Of those who were nominated after 1 April, three were still in time to participate in interactive Assembly dialogues that month, but three were not.

 

In connection with the Assembly President having set a nomination deadline, it should be noted that under the Charter, any decision by either the Assembly as a body, or by its President, relating to the functioning of the Security Council is not binding upon the Council. Accordingly, the indicative deadline set out in the Assembly President’s letters would not prevent the Council from considering candidates nominated after 1 April. And in fact, the entitlement to consider later candidates is expressly acknowledged in the Joint Letter which underscores that “early presentation of candidates . . . should not preclude others making themselves known throughout the process, as appropriate”.

 

A decision to accept later nominations might be taken in the event Council members become deadlocked over the main frontrunners and consequently would want to consider additional candidates. This, in fact, has occurred in some past appointment processes, notably in the case of the UN’s second Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who was not in the original pool of nominees.[8] And in this connection, it is noteworthy that the candidates nominated before 1 April 2026 are remarkably few when compared to past competitive appointment processes.[9]

 

Should any late but reasonable nominations be submitted, it is likely the Assembly President, notwithstanding the position taken in her letters, would decide to schedule interactive dialogues with the new candidates after the dates originally designated.

 

2. Qualifications of candidates

 

Chapter XV of the UN Charter on “The Secretariat” does not set out specific qualifications for the position of Secretary-General. That Chapter does, however, in its Article 101(3), which refers generally to Secretariat staff, give “paramount” importance to securing "the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity”, with "due regard" paid to recruiting staff “on as wide a geographical basis as possible”.

 

Drawing on this language, paragraph 40 of the 2025 resolution underlines the importance for candidates “to embody the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity”, and adds the qualification of “a firm commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter”. To these qualities, the Joint Letter adds the desirability of nominees possessing “proven leadership and managerial abilities, extensive experience in international relations and strong diplomatic, communication and multilingual skills”.

 

In addition, in its paragraph 41, the 2025 resolution reaffirms provisions in previous resolutions  

 

“on continued efforts towards achieving equal and fair distribution in terms of the gender and geographical balance with regard to appointments of executive heads of the Organization, including the Secretary-General, while meeting the highest possible standards”. (our emphasis)

 

Both the resolution and the Joint Letter note “with regret that no woman has ever held the position of Secretary-General”. And these documents each encourage Member States “to strongly consider nominating women as candidates”. In her January 2026 letter, the Assembly President recalled this when she wrote that “General Assembly resolution 79/327 and the Joint Letter encourage Member States to strongly consider nominating women as candidates”.

 

None of the Assembly President’s letters have raised the matter of regional rotation for the position of Secretary-General. This aspect was, however, referred to in resolution 79/327 when it reaffirmed

 

“continued efforts towards achieving equal and fair distribution in terms of the gender and geographical balance with regard to appointments of executive heads of the Organization, including the Secretary-General, while meeting the highest possible standards”. (our emphasis)

 

And the Joint Letter noted “the importance of regional diversity in the selection of Secretaries-General”.

 

The practice of regional rotation of the post, which had been evidenced in the appointment of Secretaries-General since 1981, was disrupted in 2016. That year, António Guterres was appointed the fourth incumbent from the UN regional group of Western European and Other States, whereas the Eastern Europe and the Latin American and Caribbean UN groups had each contended that their regions were next in line.[10]

 

It appears that for 2026, there is a general concept that regional rotation should be taken into consideration, but not be the decisive factor. In particular, this has been definitively enunciated more than once by the United States. For example, on 24 October 2025, an American representative stated

 

“We believe the process for selection of such an important position should be purely merit-based with as wide a pool of candidates as possible. With this in mind, the United States invites candidates from all regional groupings.” (S/PV.10024)

 

Of the present four candidates, three are from the Latin America and Caribbean region: Bachelet, Grossi and Grynspan. The last (and only) time someone from this region served as Secretary-General was Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982-1991). The fourth of the present candidates, Sall, is from Africa, and the last African incumbent was Kofi Annan (1997-2006).

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3. Disclosing funding sources

 

A step not required in 2016 has been codified by the 2025 resolution, and reinforced by the Joint Letter, whereby each candidate should disclose their sources of funding “at the time of nomination”. The financial disclosures transmitted with the nominations of the present four candidates, contrary to general expectation, have not specified exact funding amounts. Nor, with the exception of the statement that Grossi will be financing his campaign out of his own financial resources, have any donors been identified.

 

These are the financial disclosures included with each nomination:

 

Bachelet: “the activities related to the selection process will be financed by public resources”

 

Grossi: “las actividades relacionadas con el proceso de seleccién seran financiadas por el candidato, con recursos financieros propios”[11]

 

Grynspan: “the resources will be drawn from public and private sources”

 

Sall: “the activities related to the selection process will be financed by personal and public resources

 

Neither the resolution nor the Joint Letter makes provision for the required financial disclosures to be updated as the appointment process advances. This leaves open the possibility that significant donations could be received by candidates after their nominations which would not be reported.

 

Because these present financial disclosures lack real meaning, it is possible that either more specific and updated details of campaign financing will be required for future appointment processes, or that the request will be dropped altogether.

 

4. Work suspension by UN officials who are candidates

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Both the resolution and the Joint Letter state that candidates holding positions in the United Nations system should consider suspending their UN work during the campaign, so as to avoid “any conflict of interest that may arise from their functions and adjacent advantages”. Such a provision was not in effect with respect to the 2016 appointment process, during which a number of nominated candidates continued actively to serve in UN positions.

 

Of the four present candidates,[12] two hold positions in the UN system: 

 

Rafael Mariano Grossi is Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and he has continued to serve full-time in that function since his nomination on 26 November 2025.[13]

 

In contrast, Rebeca Grynspan Mayufis, Secretary-General of UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), announced that effective 2 March 2026, the date of her nomination, she was suspending her work in that role during the 2026 Secretary-General campaign.

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5. Vision statements

 

As mentioned above, the Assembly President’s April 2026 letter set the dates of 21 and 22 April for the individual interactive dialogues with the present four candidates. In this connection, resolution 79/327, the Joint Letter, and the Assembly President’s letters all confirm the practice, launched in 2015, that candidates should provide a vision statement at the time of nomination, which each will then have the opportunity to present during their interactive dialogue.

 

6. Appointment webpage

 

The Revitalization resolution confirms that the Assembly and Council Presidents “should jointly maintain and regularly update” a dedicated UN webpage setting out the list of candidates, together with their nominating State(s), vision statement, curriculum vitae and campaign financing disclosures. In more definitive language, in their Joint Letter the two Presidents commit that they “will” maintain and update this webpage (our emphasis). Maintaining the webpage, which was initiated for the 2015-2016 process, will continue to be an important resource not only for the UN Members making the appointment decision, but also because of anticipated widespread public interest.

 

7. Withdrawal of candidates

 

The resolution and Joint Letter confirm that for a candidacy to be withdrawn, it will be sufficient for the nominating Member to so inform the Assembly and Council Presidents. This resolves an area of confusion which existed during the 2016 process, when it was not clear whether a parallel announcement of withdrawal by candidates themselves was also required. 

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The first full withdrawal with respect to the present appointment process occurred on 25 March 2026, when Maldives informed the Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council that it was withdrawing its nomination of Virginia Gamba of Argentina. As Maldives was the only Member State which had submitted a nomination for Gamba, this announcement meant she was no longer a candidate.

 

The new government of Chile notified the UN on 25 March that it was withdrawing its nomination of Chilean national Michelle Bachelet. However, because Bachelet has also been nominated by Brazil and Mexico, she remains a candidate.

 

8. Beginning and ending timeframe for the appointment process

 

The 2025 resolution established the “bookends” for the 2026 appointment process, in that it set out the timeframe for the official launch of the process, as well as for the ultimate swearing-in of the new appointee. Paragraph 42(a) states that “The selection process should be formally initiated in the last quarter of the year preceding the end of the incumbent’s term through a joint letter” of the Assembly and Council Presidents. It adds that nominations of candidates would be expected thereafter. The 2025 Joint Letter was signed on 25 November, which was several weeks earlier than the Joint Letter sent in 2015, which was dated 15 December.

 

The swearing in of each new incumbent customarily takes place shortly after the Security Council forwards its recommendation to the Assembly, and the Assembly has in turn taken its decision. While some UN Members had hoped for an earlier timeframe, the resolution provides that this should take place during the last quarter of the year before the new term-in-office begins. The Joint Letter is even more general on this point, stating that  

 

“The Council plans to make its recommendation to the General Assembly in a timely manner so that the appointment by the Assembly allows the newly appointed Secretary-General sufficient time to prepare for the job.” (our emphasis)

 

Nonetheless, in light of the fact that the prior two competitive appointment processes of 2006 and 2016 were each completed within the first half of October, it is possible that the 2026 appointment may also be finalized well in advance of year’s end.

 

9. Target date for a Council decision on basic principles and rules for its process

 

In 2016, a first statement detailing some aspects of the process the Security Council intended to follow was not made until May, by the then Council President, Egypt, at the Security Council stakeout. The following month, the Council presidency of France sent a letter informing the General Assembly President that the Security Council intended to start the process of consideration of candidacies on 21 July. The Assembly President forwarded this letter to all UN Member States and Permanent Observers and it was posted on the appointment website, but it was not published as an official UN document.

 

As of mid-April, the Council has not yet made public the modalities it intends to follow for the 2026 appointment process. This could be agreed during the remainder of the April Council presidency of Bahrain. Subsequent Council presidencies will be China in May, Colombia in June, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in July 2026.

  

10. Dialogues of candidates with Security Council members

 

In 2016, in addition to the interactive dialogues convened in the Assembly with nominated candidates, the Council held informal meetings with each individual candidate privately at the Permanent Missions of successive Council Presidents. After the holding of these informal meetings became regularized, Security Council members agreed that the Council President would announce when each meeting had taken place. It is likely that such informal meetings will also be held in 2026, again with an announcement by the Council President after each.

 

In addition to these informal meetings with the Security Council members as a group, in 2016 candidates also traveled to the capitals of Council members. It is important to note that such visits were not organized by the Security Council as a whole, but rather were arranged bilaterally.[14]

 

11.  Timing of balloting in the Security Council

 

While otherwise the Joint Letter refrained from making firm commitments relating to the Security Council’s part of the appointment process, both Presidents agreed in the letter on the timing for the start of balloting in the Council. The letter states that the informal Assembly dialogues with candidates “can be held before the Council begins its selection by the end of July 2026”. (our emphasis)

 

This reference to the end of July, which is identical to the timing set out in the 2015 Joint Letter, thus determines the timeframe for the start of the Council’s straw polls process. And in fact, during the 2016 appointment process, the Council conformed to the start date set out in the 2015 Joint Letter by conducting its first round of straw polls on 21 July 2016.[15]

 

Some Member States have advocated starting the straw polls one month earlier, in June. The Council could itself decide to advance its polling, possibly in light of the small number of candidates.  

 

12. Means of balloting in the Security Council

 

The Security Council’s Rule 48 states that “Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting” of the Council. In practice, so long as the Council ultimately votes on its recommendation resolution in a formal private meeting, it has been considered acceptable for the informal balloting by means of straw polls to take place in informal meetings.

 

Over its history, the Security Council has employed several options for sounding out the level of support for each candidate. Until 1981, the Council conducted each round of balloting through voting, during private meetings, on an actual draft decision. Initially, the Council's official recommendation to the General Assembly pursuant to Article 97 was published not as a Council resolution, but as a communiqué issued pursuant to the Council’s Rule 55.[16] Then, from 1966 through 1976, the Council members conducted each round of balloting through voting on actual draft resolutions, and with the official recommendation published as a Council resolution.

 

Straw polls have been used for every appointment process since 1981. As this informal balloting modality has evolved, it presently provides for each Council member to indicate, with respect to each nominated candidate, whether they would "encourage" or "discourage", or have "no opinion".  While the straw polls began with white ballots distributed to all fifteen Council members, a practice developed whereby, at some later stage in the polling, permanent members would vote on coloured ballot papers (red, in current practice), so as to suggest to the Council members as a whole whether a particular nominee's candidacy might ultimately be vetoed.

 

As of 2016, straw polls have been conducted using a separate ballot paper for each candidate. The rationale for this is that in the straw polls of prior years, when all candidates were listed on a single straw poll ballot, amateur detectives among the Council members sometimes guessed which ballot was submitted by a certain member based on the overall pattern of voting on all the candidates listed together. Showing only one candidate per ballot has prevented such speculation, but also requires more time for balloting. As another measure to prevent determining which representative has cast which vote, it has long been the practice for the Security Council members to be provided with identical pens for filling out their ballots.

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Ever since straw polls came into use in 1981, once these ballots indicate that a candidate is likely to have sufficient support, the Council members then proceed to adopting a resolution, which will then be published.

 

For the 2026 process, Security Council members will have before them the question of whether to use colour-coded ballots at any point in the voting process – to foreshadow whether one or more vetoes might eventually be cast – or whether to use only white ballots for both elected and permanent members throughout. This decision, however, does not need to be made at the outset of the straw poll process, but can be taken after one or more polls have been held.

 

Should members decide again to employ colour-coded ballots, they will need to determine at what point in the process to introduce them. In the two most recent competitive appointment processes, colour-coding was introduced at what turned out to be the final straw poll: the fourth ballot in 2006, and the sixth ballot in 2016.

 

Beyond the polling modalities used by Council members in the past, it is possible that alternative methods might be considered for 2026.[17]

 

13. Announcing the results of each round of balloting

 

Since straw polls were first employed in 1981, the Security Council has never engaged in a practice of officially announcing the results after each round. For 2016, all but one Council member supported having the Council President formally communicate the results of each poll to the Assembly President, and also make a public announcement for the benefit of the wider UN membership, the candidates, the press and the interested public. But, because such a decision would require the full consensus of all fifteen Council members, the reservation of the one Council member meant that the 2016 straw poll outcomes could not be officially announced. The issue was revisited several times during the polling process, but consensus still was not reached.

 

A letter summarizing the Council’s part of the 2016 process written by Japan’s Ambassador Koro Bessho described two arguments made in 2016 by the dissenting Council member. The first relates to the fact that since 1966, the Security Council’s final recommendation to the General Assembly has been decided in the format of a Council resolution. In that light, the objecting Council member in 2016 contended that the straw polls were an internal process, in nature like the negotiating process for any Council resolution, during which interim updates are never officially disclosed by the Council. A second argument was that announcing the results of straw polls might hurt the dignity of low-polling candidates, or those encountering significant opposition, and make it difficult for them to leave the process with honour.

 

Had the straw poll results remained undisclosed in 2016, one or both of those arguments might have held validity. But in actuality, the results of the straw polls were leaked immediately after each session. Thus, the Assembly President and the candidates – as well as the UN membership, press and civil society – did learn of each outcome, but not through the agency of the Security Council. Arguably, it was worse for candidates to find out in such a backhanded way that they had polled poorly than had they been informed in a more official, dignified way by the Council itself. In 2016, then Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft wrote 

 

“It is neither respectful of the rest of the membership of the United Nations nor fair to the candidates themselves, for the results to be communicated through leaks from Council members to the world’s media.”

 

Another argument in favour of the Council officially announcing the results of each straw poll is that this would prevent mistaken reporting by the media, which did occur once in 2016.

 

Whether or not Council members can reach consensus to officially announce the results of each straw poll will be one of the most important issues relating to transparency during the 2026 appointment process.

 

14. Monthly progress meetings of the two Presidents

 

In the context of the closer cooperation established during the 2015-2016 appointment process, the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council began holding monthly meetings to monitor progress. These meetings were widely felt to be helpful, and it is expected that the practice will continue in 2026.

 

15. Narrowing the field of candidates

 

In 2016, only three of the thirteen nominees withdrew their candidacies while balloting was still underway in the Security Council. The other ten, including those who repeatedly received feeble support, chose to remain in the race. In his letter, Ambassador Bessho indicates that continued balloting on such a large number of candidates had a negative impact on effectiveness. Accordingly, he suggests it might be useful to introduce conditions for automatically eliminating candidates who underperform in the balloting process. He offers several options:

 

• allowing only candidates obtaining a minimum number of positive votes to proceed to the next round;

 

• disqualifying candidates who receive a certain number of negative votes; or

 

• limiting the number of candidates who may be retained from one round to the next.

 

However, it is believed unlikely in 2026 that the Council will formally decide on a system to eliminate underperforming candidates as the polls progress, especially given the small number of candidates presently under consideration.

 

​16. Format and contents of the Council’s recommendation to the Assembly​

 

It is sometimes believed that the Security Council’s recommendation to the General Assembly requires the consensus of all fifteen Council members, but this is not the case. Like any other substantive decision reached by the Security Council through official voting, the Council’s recommendation comes under Article 27(3) of the Charter and thus requires only a minimum of nine affirmative votes, with no negative vote by any permanent member. And in fact, in the 1953 recommendation that Dag Hammarskjöld be appointed to his first term, one Council member, the Republic of China, abstained.[13]

 

Since 1976, the Security Council has standardized the language of its recommendation to the General Assembly. As set out most recently, the operative paragraph of resolution 2580 (2021) reads

 

“Recommends to the General Assembly that Mr. António Guterres be appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations for a [second] term of office from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2026.”

 

The Charter itself is silent as to the duration of the term in office of the Secretary-General. General Assembly resolution 11(I) of 1946 provided that “The first Secretary-General shall be appointed for five years, the appointment being open at the end of that period for a further five-year term.” It is indicative of the practice during the Organization’s earliest years that Security Council resolution 168 (1961) – by which the Council recommended that U Thant be appointed to fill the “unexpired portion” of Dag Hammarskjöld’s term of office – twice referred to Hammarskjöld’s term as having been “fixed by the General Assembly”. In total, nine terms of office were decided by the General Assembly without a duration having been included in the Council’s recommendation resolution. However, from 1976 forward, the Security Council’s resolutions have consistently specified the dates for which the Council’s recommendation is valid. And these terms of office specified by the Council have then been replicated in the Assembly’s decision.

 

Concluding observations

 

By setting out the schedule and modalities for the General Assembly’s interactive dialogues with each candidate, the Assembly President’s letters take an important forward step in advancing this year’s Secretary-General appointment process. In this, and in other of their contents, these letters build upon the considerable milestones of the 2025 “Revitalization” resolution and the Joint Letter. Moreover, in her letters, it appears also that the Assembly President is seeking to institute new measures to address perceived inadequacies in the arrangements for the dialogues held in 2016.

 

With the formulation of precise guidelines for the conduct of the interactive dialogues with each candidate, the General Assembly’s procedures for 2026 are now relatively well-defined. Still outstanding however, is the need for the Security Council to agree on the parameters for its 2026 informal polling process. This ideally would be decided before the 21 April start of the Assembly dialogues, but in actuality could be determined anytime between now and the Council’s commitment, as set out in the Joint Letter, to begin its own selection process “by the end of July 2026”.

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Creating a sound procedural framework for the appointment process is an important step. Nonetheless, the real test will come with implementation of the process by both the General Assembly and the Security Council. For the credibility of the next incumbent, and of the United Nations itself, it is hoped that the 2026 proceedings will be grounded on genuine cooperation between the Assembly and the Council, and with maximum possible inclusivity, transparency and commitment. And most importantly, it is also hoped that the candidate who appears most qualified to the majority of General Assembly members and civil society will be the same candidate ultimately recommended by the Security Council.

                                                                             

*      *      *      *      *

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On the question of regional rotation in appointing Secretaries-General, see the article on this website: "Appointing the next Secretary-General: The relevance of regional rotation".

 

See also Table 5 for the dates of the decisions by the Security Council and General Assembly on appointing Secretaries-General.

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(This article supplements pages 404 to 415 of the book.)

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[1] This March letter, and its attached annex, amplified the Assembly President’s letter dated 14 January 2026 which gave preliminary details concerning the dialogues.

[2] On 2 February 2026, Brazil, Chile and Mexico jointly nominated Chilean national Michelle Bachelet Jeria. On 25 March, the new government of Chile announced that it was withdrawing this nomination, but because Bachelet was also nominated by Brazil and Mexico, she remains a candidate.

[3] The venue also was the Trusteeship Council Chamber in 2016, the first time such General Assembly interactive dialogues with candidates were held.

[4] These arrangements were set out in the letter of 25 February 2016 by the then General Assembly President.

[5] For further details about the 2025 resolution, see related article on this website.

[6] See the next section of this article for the time limit and other details regarding participation by civil society representatives.

[7] For background on the basis of participation by civil society representatives in the dialogues, see related article on this website.

[8] See Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, London, Bodley Head, 1972, pp. 11-12.

[9] For example, in 2016, there were thirteen officially nominated candidates. The 2006 process was less transparent, but it was widely reported that seven candidates were nominated.

[10] For background on the factor of regional rotation in appointing Secretaries-General, see related article on this website.

[11] Submitted in Spanish only. Unofficial translation: “The activities related to the selection process will be financed by the candidate, using his own financial resources.”

[12] On 26 November 2025, Argentina nominated, through a published letter, its national Rafael Mariano Grossi. On 2 February 2026, Brazil, Chile and Mexico jointly nominated Chilean national Michelle Bachelet Jeria. On 25 March, the new government of Chile announced that it was withdrawing this nomination, but because she was also nominated by Brazil and Mexico, Bachelet remains a candidate. On 2 March 2026, the President of Burundi nominated Macky Sall of Senegal. (On 27 March, after 20 African Union Member States broke silence on a text by which the AU would have endorsed Sall's nomination, the distinction became clear that Sall's nomination was made in Burundi's national capacity, not in the Burundi President's capacity as AU Chairperson.) On 3 March 2026, Costa Rica nominated its national Rebeca Grynspan Mayufis. On 11 March 2026, it was announced that Maldives has nominated Virginia Gamba de Potgieter of Argentina, making her the second Argentinian candidate. However, Maldives withdrew this nomination on 25 March. On 25 April 2025, Bolivia had written a letter (not published as an official UN document) to all UN Permanent Missions and Observers informing them that it would be nominating its national David Choquehuanca Céspedes. As of yet, this letter has not been followed up by a formal nomination.

[13] See Ferreira, Anton. “SG Election 2026: Grossi Holds on to His IAEA Job while Running for UN Boss”, PassBlue, 16 March 2026 (accessed 12 April 2026).

[14] The General Assembly interactive dialogues and subsequent informal dialogues candidates have with Security Council members will not be the only occasions at which nominees promote their candidacies with UN Member States. For example, on 6 March, Michelle Bachelet met with members of the UN Africa Group and discussed with them her platform priorities. And many other such meetings by all the candidates are being highlighted on social media. 

[15] The final, and decisive, sixth straw poll was held on 5 October 2016.

[16] The only time during the 1946-1962 period that the Council adopted a resolution setting out its recommendation to the Assembly was in the unprecedented situation following the death of Dag Hammarskjöld, when the Council recommended the appointment of U Thant as Acting Secretary-General by resolution 168 (1961).

[17] For a detailed history of how straw polling has evolved, see "Power, Process and Participation: The Search for the Next Secretary-General", Security Council Report, 15 April 2026 (accessed 17 April 2026).