Chapter 8:   SUBSIDIARY BODIES

Section 7:   Appointment of bureaux of subsidiary bodies

 

Five months after target date, Council finally names 2025 bureaux of its subsidiary bodies

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In a Note by the President dated 29 May 2025 (S/2025/2), the Security Council at last announced the Chairs and Vice Chairs of its subsidiary organs for the year 2025. The normal target date for publishing the bureaux is the first working day of January, after the start of the terms of the five incoming members, and the 2024 appointments were announced by that date. In the prior three years, exact timeliness was not achieved, but compared to 2025, the delays were relatively short: 17 working days in 2023, seven working days in 2022, and three working days in 2021.[1]

 

Although the official announcement is to be made on the first working day of each new year, the comprehensive presidential note on working methods S/2024/507 provides that Council members “should make every effort to agree provisionally on the appointment of the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies for the following year no later than 1 October.” This is in order that incoming chairs will have the necessary time to prepare for their new responsibilities, and for there to be no gaps in the leadership handover of each subsidiary body.  

 

The process for reaching agreement on appointing subsidiary organ bureaux is set out in S/2024/507. This presidential note states that consultations on the appointments are to be “facilitated jointly by two members of the Security Council working in full cooperation.”. One co-facilitator is to be a permanent member, understood to be the P5 rotating coordinator for the relevant months. As it happened, the process for appointing the 2025 bureaux took so long that all five permanent members served as P5 co-facilitator during that period.[2] The second co-facilitator, as explained by the representative of Japan in a 2016 press conference, is to be the elected member serving as the Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG) (see related article on this website).

 

By practice, the appointment of each year’s bureaux is published in a presidential note. Presidential notes require the consensus of all fifteen Council members and thus can be blocked if even one Council member disagrees. In this context, several factors contributed to the five-month delay with respect to agreeing the 2025 chairpersonships.

 

In recent years, soon after their election in June, the five incoming members (I5) have made a concerted effort to agree among themselves on a complete “package” of Chairs for all open positions as the basis for negotiations with the P5. However, among the members elected for 2025-2026 terms – Denmark, Greece, Pakistan, Panama and Somalia – it emerged during their discussions that several were interested in chairing the same subsidiary bodies. And this was complicated, in at least one case, by the interest of a remaining elected member to chair a particular body for a one-year term in 2025. Owing to these overlapping bids, the process for the incoming members to come up with a mutually agreed list of their proposals became prolonged and difficult.

 

A second factor delaying the 2025 appointments process was the objection by one or more permanent members to several successive proposed I5 packages. After such objections were firmly stated, the I5 had no recourse but to try to agree on revised proposals.

 

Ultimately, several compromises were reached which allowed the 2025 appointments to be finalized at the end of May 2025. As a result, the incoming members will be chairing the subsidiary organs listed below (the italicized names in parentheses indicate the former 2024 Chair). In cases where the matter being addressed is not indicated in the subsidiary body’s official name, a footnote provides this information. Three Informal Expert Groups – on climate, peace and security; protection of civilians; and women and peace and security – are included here even though their Co-Chairs are not set out in the annual presidential note on bureaux. They are listed here because incoming members take the co-chairing of these Informal Expert Groups into consideration when measuring the overall workload they estimate they can handle.

 

Denmark: 

• Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities (Malta)

• Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions – Co-Chair with Pakistan (Japan as sole Chair)

• Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security – Co-Chair with Sierra Leone (not recorded in presidential note S/2025/2[3]) (Sierra Leone and Switzerland)

• Informal Expert Group on Protection of Civilians – Co-Chair with United Kingdom (not recorded in presidential note S/2025/2)

 

Greece:

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)[4] (Switzerland)

• Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (Malta) 

• Informal Working Group on General Security Council Sanctions Issues – Co-Chair with Pakistan (this is the first bureau appointed since the working group was established by resolution 2744 in 2024)

 

Pakistan: 

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)[5] (Ecuador)

• Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions – Co-Chair with Denmark (Japan as sole Chair)

• Informal Working Group on General Security Council Sanctions Issues – Co-Chair with Greece (this is the first bureau appointed since the working group was established by resolution 2744 in 2024)

 

Panama: 

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)[6] (Ecuador)

• Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Al-Shabaab (Japan)

• Informal Expert Group on Climate, Peace and Security – Co-Chair with Guyana, Republic of Korea and Slovenia (not recorded in presidential note S/2025/2)

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Somalia: 

• Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya (Japan)

• Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa (Mozambique)

 

The 2025 chairing appointments of the elected members serving their second year on the Council will remain those decided in 2024, as detailed in another article [8 7m] on this website. In addition, Slovenia is taking on, for a single year, the position of Facilitator for the Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), previously held by Malta, which relates to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with respect to Iran’s nuclear programme.

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Co-Chair arrangements

 

As mentioned above, the 2025 appointments reflect a number of compromises. Among these is agreement that for the first time since its establishment in 1993, the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG) will be led not by a single Chair, but by two Co-Chairs, incoming members Denmark and Pakistan. Moreover, Greece and Pakistan have been appointed to co-chair the Informal Working Group on General Security Council Sanctions Issues. This is the first time the leadership of a Council working group on general issues of sanctions[7] will have been shared.[8]

 

While no counter-terror subsidiary organ or individual sanctions committee has ever been led by Co-Chairs, a Co-Chair arrangement for thematic bodies is not without precedent. The Council’s Ad Hoc Committee on Mandate Review, established in 2006 in response to the World Summit Outcome Document, was co-chaired during its first year by Slovakia and the United States, and by Slovakia and South Africa during the Committee’s second and last year, 2007. In addition, Co-Chairs have continuously led the Council’s three thematic Informal Expert Groups – on climate; protection of civilians; and women and peace and security.

 

While any of the elected members may initially have envisaged serving as sole Chair of the IWG or the sanctions working group, establishing Co-Chair arrangements was instrumental in resolving competing claims and prepared the way for finalizing the 2025 package. In addition, appointing Co-Chairs for these two working groups allows more elected members to take a lead role in these important areas of the Council’s work. It remains to be seen whether a Co-Chair arrangement for these two bodies will continue in future years, or whether this was a measure agreed only to resolve the difficulties which arose regarding the 2025 bureaux.

 

A single-year term for the resolution 2231 Facilitator

 

As noted above, Slovenia, in its second year on the Council, is taking on a one-year assignment as Facilitator for the Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). There has been a general sense among Council members that it is preferable for a Chair to serve for two successive years, in order to enhance continuity and deepen understanding of the issues. Nonetheless, from 1990 to the present, there have been 64 cases of a Council member chairing a subsidiary body for a single year, the most recent prior case being Japan as Chair of the IWG for the single year of 2024 (see Table at the end of this article). As specifically concerns the position of the resolution 2231 Facilitator, it was most recently held for a single year by the Netherlands in 2018.

 

Which individuals and Council delegations serve as Chairs and Vice Chairs

 

As is indicated in the presidential note announcing each year’s bureaux, Chairs serve in their individual capacities, that is, each representative is listed by his or her name. In contrast, the name of the country is given for Vice Chairs, indicating that these serve in their collective capacity.

 

While it is largely Permanent Representatives who serve as Chairs, a Council member may instead designate a Deputy Permanent Representative (DPR) to chair a subsidiary body assigned to it. A first instance of such an arrangement occurred when the Deputy Permanent Representative of Finland served as the first Chair of the 661 Sanctions Committee established in 1990 after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Later, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations was successively chaired by DPRs in the first years after its establishment in 2001. More recently, Deputy Permanent Representatives have chaired the Libya sanctions committee,[9] as well as the counter-terror committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015).[10] Thus, there was ample precedent for issuing in early June 2025 an update presidential note which indicated that the Deputy Permanent Representative of Somalia will chair the Libya sanctions committee.

 

Since the Security Council’s first decades, generally only elected members have been appointed Chairs of the Council’s subsidiary bodies. The book (pages 556-57) explains that

 

“The rationale for this practice . . . may relate to an understanding reached in 1946 among the wider UN membership that the permanent members [of the Security Council] would have virtually continuous membership in some of the other United Nations principal organs or their governing bodies. As part of that understanding, it was reportedly agreed that the permanent members would not serve on the bureaux of those organs or governing bodies, so as to give the opportunity to other Member States to serve in leadership positions. It is possible that, in parallel, the same principle was applied to the bureaux of subsidiary organs of the Security Council.”

 

There have, nonetheless, been a few instances when permanent members have chaired Council subsidiary organs. The Committee of Inquiry established by resolution 496 (1981) in connection with Seychelles was chaired by France. The United Kingdom was the first Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, while the Russian Federation served as its third Chair. In addition, France was the first Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.

 

For 2025, the majority of Vice Chairs will again be elected members. However, four permanent members – China,[11] France,[12]  Russian Federation[13] and United Kingdom[14] – will continue to serve as Vice Chairs of several subsidiary bodies.[15] China only began serving as a Vice Chair as recently as 2024. The United States, as has been its consistent practice, will hold no Vice Chair positions in 2025. 

 

The role of Vice Chair varies considerably from one subsidiary body to another. In many cases, Vice Chairs mainly provide geographic balance for the bureaux. In other instances, however. Chairs work closely with their Vice Chairs, particularly concerning important decisions. And in still other cases, the Vice Chairs of bodies such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee or the 1540 Committee have distinct, ongoing responsibilities. 

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Possible improvements for future appointment processes

 

The extreme five-month delay in agreeing the 2025 bureaux is an anomaly not likely to be repeated in future years. Nonetheless, it points to the need to re-evaluate and improve the appointment process.

 

One possible improvement would be to reinstate the active, central role played in past years by the Chair (now Co-Chairs) of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG) in coordinating among the incoming members (I5). When, previously, IWG Chairs have led the discussions pursuant to the 2016 understanding mentioned above, incoming members have each been freer to stake out national positions. In contrast, when the I5 have primarily worked on their own, one or the other has sometimes been in the forefront of reaching compromises at the expense of their own national preferences. In addition, IWG Chairs, having already been through their own appointment process, and also experienced in their current roles as subsidiary body Chairs, can offer useful background guidance to assist the I5 in making more informed decisions. Moreover, IWG Chairs serving as co-facilitators have brought extended continuity to the I5 negotiating process, a quality which is lacking when the monthly rotating E10 coordinators have tried to facilitate the process. And finally, IWG Chairs, having an established working relationship with the permanent members, when acting as co-facilitator can serve as a kind of buffer between the I5 and the P5.

 

Contingency measure applicable in the event of delayed appointments

 

In 2023, the Security Council adopted a contingency measure for years when the appointment of bureaux of the Council’s subsidiary bodies becomes delayed beyond 1 January. This measure, subsequently incorporated into presidential note S/2024/507, provides that

 

“. . . unless agreement is reached by 1 January on the appointment of the Chairs and, consequently, Vice-Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Council for the year, as a contingency measure, the responsibilities of Chairs of all of the subsidiary bodies of the Council during the month of January shall devolve to the President for the month of January.”

 

As detailed in a related article on this website, this contingency measure needed to be invoked on a number of occasions in 2025 during the period when all subsidiary bodies were without bureaux. However, it proved to be inadequate in several respects. First, the measure was explicitly valid only for January, creating an uncertain legal status for actions by Council Presidents on behalf of subsidiary bodies in subsequent months, albeit the President could be considered acting in those instances on behalf of the Council pursuant to procedural Rule 19. Second, some Council members did not agree to certain functions being undertaken on behalf of a subsidiary body by Council Presidents, including the convening of a formal or informal meeting, or giving a subsidiary body briefing to the Council requested by a Council decision. Therefore, the contingency measure notwithstanding, the vast majority of the work of subsidiary bodies was on hold during the 2025 five-month delay, leaving a considerable backlog once bureaux were finally appointed. Among the important responsibilities left in abeyance were, in some instances, adopting annual work programmes and reviewing expert group reports mandated by Council resolutions. A third drawback of the contingency measure was that responsibilities relating to the interim functioning of subsidiary bodies added to the already heavy workloads of each monthly Council presidency.

 

A partial improvement might be to update the contingency measure to provide that if a remaining elected member served as the Chair of a subsidiary body during the prior year, it would remain in that capacity on an ad interim basis until new bureaux were decided. In 2025, this would have meant that thirteen of the Council’s 24 subsidiary bodies would have been fully functional pending final agreement on the 2025 appointments. This also would reduce the number of bodies which a Council President needs to assist in the event of delayed appointments.

 

It is important to note that one negative repercussion of delayed appointments cannot be mitigated by contingency measures. This is the fact that incoming Chairs whose appointments are significantly delayed lose the opportunity for a thorough handover from outgoing Chairs and their teams, many of whom leave New York shortly after their terms end.

 

Concluding observations

 

For many elected members, chairing a key subsidiary body can be one of the high points of their term, and the means by which they make some of their most significant contributions. In particular, serving as Chair can sometimes give an elected member a leadership role when the matter for which their subsidiary body is responsible comes up for consideration by the Security Council itself. This latter function is one which some elected members are committed to enlarging, especially to include a more formal penholding role in the drafting of relevant Council outcome documents. At the same time, chairpersonships can be very demanding assignments for elected members, requiring a significant commitment of time and personnel, and sometimes placing them at the centre of unwanted controversies.

 

Accordingly, it is often difficult for incoming members to accept, or forgo, chairing assignments when this has not aligned with their national Security Council priorities. Moreover, the abrasive nature of the negotiations in some years has been a disheartening first experience for elected members on the eve of the start of their terms. However, there seems to be no truly effective alternative to the earliest possible decision on chairing arrangements, and the necessary difficult compromises this may entail.

 

It is likely that the unprecedented 2025 delay will serve as an impetus for future incoming Council members to make every effort to decide upon a workable “package”, as well as for the permanent members to show flexibility in their responses. Nonetheless, difficulties in finalizing the selection of Chairs will on occasion probably still arise, especially during years when very desirable, or very undesirable, positions are to be filled.

 

 

 

The first PDF is a Chart showing the timeliness of publishing the bureaux for each year since 2000. The second PDF is a Table of all one-year chairing appointments since 1990. The third PDF is an updated List of penholders, now including those that devolve from chairing assignments.

 

(This update supplements pages 556 to 559 of the book.)

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[1] See related article on this website.

[2] Following the June 2024 election of the incoming members, the P5 coordinator was first France (through July), followed by China (August through October), United States (November through January 2025), Russian Federation (February through April), and finally United Kingdom (beginning in May, the month at the end of which agreement on the bureaux was finally reached).

[3] The Informal Expert Group is not formally recognized as a Council subsidiary organ owing to the nuanced language of resolution 2242 (2015) by which it was established, and its Co-Chairs are therefore not designated in presidential note S/2025/2 (see related article on this website).

[4] Relating to the DPRK nuclear weapons programme.

[5] Relating to Afghanistan and the Taliban.

[6] Relating to counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

[7] The Security Council maintained an Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions from 2000 through 2006.

[8] In light of the fact that Co-Chairs will lead both of these working groups, neither will have Vice Chairs in 2025.  

[9] Germany, 2019-2020.

[10] Norway, 2021-2022.

[11] Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti; Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Al-Shabaab; Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

[12] Counter-Terrorism Committee; Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004). 

[13] Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; Counter-Terrorism Committee; Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011); Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004).

[14] Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004); Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

[15] The first time a permanent member served as a Vice Chair was in 2001, when the Russian Federation was named as one of the three Vice Chairs for the newly established Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). The United Kingdom became the next P5 to do so when it took up a Vice Chair position with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 upon that committee’s creation in 2004. And France began serving as a Vice Chair of the CTC.

 

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