Chapter 3:   THE PEOPLE

Section 1:   Secretary-General and the Secretariat

 

As Secretary-General candidates are encouraged to act under Article 99, how have prior incumbents exercised this power? 

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During the April and June 2026 General Assembly interactive dialogues with the candidates for Secretary-General, each of the six candidates was asked how they might be more activist in the position, including through the possible use of Article 99 of the UN Charter. And at the conclusion of the 2016 appointment process, many expressed the hope that António Guterres would be a proactive Secretary-General, including by utilizing his Article 99 powers.[1] However, while informal use of Article 99 is an ever-present option, historically Secretaries-Generals have formally acted under Article 99 sparingly and with caution.

 

Article 99 reads reads 

 

“The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”

 

And it should be noted that Rule 3 of the Security Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure, first adopted on 17 January 1946, provides that if the Secretary-General acts pursuant to Article 99, the Council is obligated to convene a meeting. Rule 3 reads in part

 

“The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council . . . if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.” (our emphasis)

 

The calculations as to how many times Secretaries-General have exercised their Article 99 power span a wide range, from four cases to more than one hundred. Such diversity is explained by the fact that recourse to Article 99 can be defined very narrowly or far more broadly.  When a Secretary-General has explicitly invoked Article 99, there has been no problem in identifying recourse to that Article, but such specificity has been rare. Rather, many more cases exist where a Secretary-General has, upon his own initiative, raised an issue with the Security Council without directly citing Article 99.  In these latter cases, there are a number of variables which may suggest that Article 99 has been in play.  These include:

 

• Did the Secretary-General use the language of Article 99, even if not explicitly invoking that Article?

 

• Did the Secretary-General later characterize his initiative as recourse to Article 99?

 

• Was the situation at issue not listed in the Summary Statement of matters of which the Security Council is seized (the Council’s “Agenda”), and therefore was being raised with the Council for the first time?

 

• Did the Secretary-General request that the Council convene a meeting or take other action?

 

• Did any Member State, or other entity entitled to request a Security Council meeting make such a request at the same time as the Secretary-General?[2]

 

• Did the Secretary-General communicate to the Council orally or in writing, and if in writing, was the letter published or unpublished?

 

Keeping in mind these variables, what follows is a generous list of noteworthy cases which have elements relating to Article 99, but not all of which constitute clear recourse to it.[3]

 

Trygve Lie (1946-1952):

 

The situation on the Korean peninsula (1950)

On page 161, our book recalled that on 25 June 1950, when the Security Council met after war broke out on the Korean peninsula, the agenda cited a communication from the United States requesting “an immediate meeting of the Security Council”, and also a cablegram from the UN Commission on Korea. Addressing the meeting, Secretary-General Lie asserted that

 

“The present situation is a serious one and is a threat to international peace.  The Security Council is, in my opinion, the competent organ to deal with it.  I consider it the clear duty of the Security Council to take steps necessary to re-establish peace in that area.”

 

Lie also stated that after he was informed that a conflict appeared to have broken out in Korea,

 

“I immediately dispatched telegrams to the United Nations Commission on Korea asking for a report. This morning the reply of the Commission was received and it has been circulated to members of the Security Council as document S/1496.” (S/PV.473)

 

Although in his remarks to the Council Lie made no clear reference to Article 99, at a meeting of the General Assembly on 28 September 1950, Lie stated

 

“I refer . . . to my statement to the Security Council on 25 June last, concerning the Korean conflict, when for the first time I invoked Article 99 of the Charter” (A/PV.289 (V)). 

 

It would seem therefore that Lie considered that his act of requesting, and then transmitting to the Council the report of the UN Commission on Korea constituted an exercise of his power under Article 99. While Lie’s interpretation of his initiative may seem overstated, it should be recalled that the United Nations had then only been in existence for four years, and no prior cases of acting under Article 99 had occurred.

 

Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-1961):

 

The Congo crisis (1960)

On 13 July 1960, Hammarskjöld sent a letter to the Council President stating,

 

“I wish to inform you that I have to bring to the attention of the Security Council a matter which, in my opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, I request you to call an urgent meeting of the Security Council to hear a report of the Secretary-General on a demand for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo. May I suggest that the meeting is called for tonight at 8.30 p.m.” (S/4381)

 

While this letter did not explicitly cite Article 99, it echoed the wording of that Article, in that Hammarskjöld stated that in his opinion, the situation in the Congo “may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”. When the Council convened later that same day, the agenda made reference to the Secretary-General’s letter as a sub-item. During the meeting, the Council President stated that “This meeting has been called at the request of the Secretary-General”.  Upon taking the floor, Hammarskjöld stated that “The reason for my request, under Article 99 of the Charter, for an immediate meeting of the Security Council is the situation which has arisen in the newly independent Republic of the Congo.” In response to remarks by the Soviet representative, Hammarskjöld made clear that it had been his own initiative to request that the Council meet, rather than his having acted at the behest of the Congolese government  (S/PV.873).

 

The situation in Tunisia (1961)

On 21 and 22 July 1961, at the request of Tunisia, the Council convened two meetings to discuss a complaint by that Government that France had attacked its city of Bizerte.  At the outset of the second meeting, Hammarskjöld stated that

 

“News reaching us from Tunisia indicates that the serious and threatening development which the Council took up for consideration yesterday continues, with risks of irreparable damage to international peace and security. In view of the obligations of the Secretary-General under Article 99 of the Charter, I consider it my duty in the circumstances to make an urgent appeal to this Council. Whatever the problems which may arise in an effort to get a complete and definitive resolution, there is need for immediate action which cannot wait for the more time-consuming consideration necessary in order to reach an agreed conclusion to this debate”. (S/PV.962)

 

Since the Council had already decided to hold these two meetings in response to the request of the Tunisian Government, it would seem that Hammarskjöld was invoking Article 99 in order to bring to the Council’s attention not so much the need to meet on this matter, as the need to act on it.

 

U Thant (1961-1971):

 

The situation in East Pakistan vis-à-vis the adjoining Indian states (1971)

On 20 July 1971, in a memorandum to the Council President, Thant described the worsening situation along the borders of East Pakistan and elsewhere in the sub-continent, and concluded by saying, “It is for these reasons that I am taking the unusual step of reporting to the President of the Security Council on a question which has not been inscribed on the Council's agenda.”  This memorandum was reprinted in Thant’s report of 3 December 1971 (S/10410), together with this explanation

 

“In view of his conviction that this situation constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Secretary-General feels that he should report to the Security Council on the efforts he has made so far in regard to this problem. The Secretary-General has kept the President of the Security Council informed of these efforts under the broad terms of Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that ‘The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security’.”

 

Kurt Waldheim (1972-1981):

 

The situation in Cyprus (1974)

On 16 July 1974, Waldheim wrote to the Council President stating that

 

“In view of the seriousness of this matter in relation to international peace and security and in view of the United Nations involvement in Cyprus, I request you to convene the Security Council in order that I may report to the Council on the information which I have received through my Special Representative in Cyprus and the Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus”. (S/11334) 

 

When the Council convened later that same day, its President stated

 

“This meeting of the Council has been convened pursuant to the request contained in the letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council [S/11334], and in the letter dated 16 July 1974 from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Council [S/11335].” 

 

In addressing the Council, Waldheim first reported on the attempted coup in Cyprus and its aftermath, and then added

 

“in the context of the Cyprus problem such events carry a serious risk of a threat to international peace and security in a much wider framework. For all these reasons, and in view of the Security Council’s responsibilities in the Cyprus problem, I have felt it my duty to make this report to the Council today.” (S/PV.1779)

 

The case for considering this initiative by Waldheim to be recourse to Article 99 is somewhat tenuous, given that the situation in Cyprus was already on the Council’s Summary Statement, that the Cypriot government also requested that the Council meet, and that Waldheim’s letter and statement only vaguely mirrored the language of Article 99. Nonetheless, it is significant that Waldheim conveyed his request that the Council meet in writing, in a letter to be publicly issued as an official Security Council document.

 

The situation in Lebanon (1976)[4]

In an unpublished letter to the Security Council President dated 30 March 1976,[5] Waldheim put forward his view that unless there was a ceasefire, the civil war in Lebanon risked becoming a threat to international peace and security. Waldheim concluded his letter by stating

 

“Given the magnitude of the tragedy and the implications it carries for endangering the wider peace of the area, and conscious of the efforts being made in the area to resolve the problem, I believe it is now incumbent on me to draw the attention of the Council to the gravity of the situation in Lebanon.”[6]

 

While the letter seemed to imply that Waldheim was acting under Article 99, he did not explicitly cite that Article. The New York Times suggested that because Arab countries had made it clear that they opposed “internationalizing” the Lebanese situation, Waldheim had avoided citing Article 99 because this would have obligated the Security Council to take the specific step of convening a formal meeting.[7]

 

In any event, after receiving the letter, the Security Council did not hold any formal meetings on Lebanon throughout the rest of the year. Possibly owing to this rebuff, Waldheim did not mention his initiative either in his 1976 Annual Report to the General Assembly[8] or in his memoir.[9] However, in addition to The New York Times, Waldheim’s letter was mentioned in several other accounts, including in James Daniel Ryan’s The United Nations under Kurt Waldheim, 1972-1981.[10]

 

The situation in Iran (1979)

On 25 November 1979, Waldheim wrote to the Council President that in his opinion, the crisis in Iran, where United States diplomats were being held hostage, “poses a serious threat to international peace and security”. He added

 

“Accordingly, in the exercise of my responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations, I ask that the Security Council be convened urgently in an effort to seek a peaceful solution in conformity with the principles of justice and international law”. (S/13646) 

 

When the Council convened two days later, on 27 November, it did so with the Secretary-General’s letter as a sub-item. In addition, the Council President stated, “I wish to refer to the letter of the Secretary-General dated 25 November [S/13646], on the basis of which the Council is meeting.” When Waldheim took the floor, he expressed his appreciation to the President and the Council members “for having convened this highest organ of the United Nations for international peace and security in response to my letter of 25 November.” After referring to both the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran and the redress sought by the Government of Iran for actions committed by the previous Iranian regime, Waldheim stated

 

“It was in the light of these developments and of the escalation of tension that I concluded that the present crisis poses a serious threat to international peace and security.  Accordingly, in the exercise of my responsibility under the Charter, I asked for the urgent convening of the Security Council.”  (S/PV.2172)

 

The situation between Iran and Iraq (1980)

On 23 September 1980, Waldheim wrote a letter to the Council stating

 

“I am deeply concerned at the escalation of the conflict between Iran and Iraq which constitutes, in my opinion, a potentially grave threat to international peace and security. . . . In view of the dangers which will inevitably arise from a further escalation of this conflict I feel that it is urgently necessary, as a first step, for the members of the Security Council to meet in consultation. I would be grateful therefore if you could arrange for such consultations at the earliest possible time.” (S/14196)

 

Two days later, on 25 September, Waldheim again wrote to the Council President. After expressing his appreciation that the Council had “immediately responded” to his prior request, he detailed his further efforts to encourage the two parties to settle their differences by negotiation. He then stated

 

“Unfortunately, despite all of these efforts the fighting has continued and intensified . . . . As I stated in my appeal of 22 September, the current situation is an undoubted threat to international peace and security. I therefore feel obliged, in the exercise of my responsibilities as Secretary-General of the United Nations, to suggest that the Security Council should consider this matter with the utmost urgency.” (S/14127)

 

The Council convened on 26 September, pursuant to the requests of Council members Mexico and Norway. (S/PV.2247)

 

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982-1991):

 

The situation between Iran and Iraq (1987)

In his Annual Report to the General Assembly,[11] Javier Pérez de Cuéllar wrote that in January 1987,

 

“I called for the Security Council to consult, possibly at the level of foreign ministers, on action to halt the [Iran-Iraq] war . . . The Council acted decisively, adopting unanimously a resolution ordering immediate implementation of the cease-fire called for earlier and defining steps to be taken by the two countries in order to establish a basis for peace.”

 

Pérez de Cuéllar did not make explicit reference to Article 99, nor echo its language, in describing his initiative.

 

The situation in Lebanon (1989)

On 15 August 1989, Pérez de Cuéllar wrote to the Security Council President concerning the worsening situation in Lebanon. Stating that in his opinion “the present crisis poses a serious threat to international peace and security”, he declared

 

“Accordingly, in the exercise of my responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations, I ask that the Security Council be convened urgently in order to contribute to a peaceful solution of the problem”. (S/20789) 

 

When the Council convened later that same day, the Council President stated that the Council was meeting “immediately” in response “to the urgent appeal addressed to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in his letter of 15 August 1989” (S/PV.2875). 

 

In a report issued later that year, Pérez de Cuéllar wrote

 

“Last August, when the fighting in and around Beirut had escalated to an unprecedented level, I felt compelled, for the first time in my tenure as Secretary-General, to invoke Article 99 of the Charter.” (S/20789)

 

In his memoir, Pérez de Cuéllar wrote, in reference to his invoking Article 99 with regard to Lebanon, that during his term “I resorted to this procedure only two other times”.[12] One of these cases must certainly have been his initiative in 1987 with respect to the Iran-Iraq war. However, this would contradict the statement in his 1989 report that his 1989 letter concerning Lebanon constituted his first invocation of Article 99. The third case to which he referred in his memoir has not been identified.

 

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan, and Ban Ki-moon never formally invoked Article 99. Rather, our book observes that

 

“as part of the expanding interactions, both formal and informal, between the Secretary-General and the Council members, it became somewhat commonplace for these Secretaries-General to draw the attention of the Council to situations already on its agenda which were deteriorating, and to request that the Council consider taking appropriate action. These alerts could be given to the Council through written reports of the Secretary-General, during his briefings in both formal meetings and informal consultations of the whole, by letter, or in informal settings such as the monthly luncheons and retreats.”[13]

 

This more informal approach to Article 99 was commented upon by Kofi Annan’s Spokesperson during a noon briefing on 1 April 2002.  Asked by a journalist why Annan had requested to give another briefing to the Council members, this time in consultations, on the worsening situation in the Middle East, the spokesperson responded: 

 

“The situation on the ground is moving very rapidly and dramatically. It’s some 72 hours since he last briefed the Council, and he’s assuming that the Council would want to stay seized on a daily basis with the dangerous situation in the Middle East. So he did, it’s true, call for this meeting, and he’s had telephone calls with world leaders throughout the weekend.  So he has information to impart to the Council to assist them in their deliberations on the matter. . . . I don’t know the precise way it came about, but this is not the first time that through an exchange between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council that they mutually agreed to call a meeting. As he took the initiative, it would be under Article 99 of the Charter, which authorizes him to bring to the Council’s attention any threat to international peace and security. But they’re working so closely these days that it’s a phone call and not a formal letter any more to get the machinery going.”

 

What follows are some examples of these later Secretaries-General raising matters with the Security Council without invoking Article 99:

 

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996):

 

It was particularly in connection with the various conflicts springing from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia that proactive initiatives of Boutros-Ghali became so numerous that today they are difficult to count. In one case, on the evening of 2 April 1993, Boutros-Ghali wrote a letter to the Council President on the basis of information received from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees describing

 

“the disturbing situation which has developed in Srebrenica . . . following the decision of the Bosnian Serb military authorities not to permit any further aid to be delivered to that town”. 

 

The Secretary-General concluded his letter by stating that the Council members “may wish to consider what supportive action they might take in this extremely worrying situation”. (S/25519)

 

In another case, by a letter dated 14 July 1993, the Secretary-General informed the Council President that he had “come to the conclusion that developments at the Maslenica bridge and the Zemunik airport deserve the urgent attention of the Council.” However, Boutros-Ghali stopped short of requesting that the Council meet on the situation, and instead merely stated that “The Council may wish to consider the danger posed by this situation and decide upon appropriate action” (S26082). When the Council met on 15 July, the Secretary-General’s letter was cited as the only sub-item to the agenda, and the Council adopted a presidential statement expressing deep concern “at the information contained in the letter of the Secretary-General”. (S/26084)

 

Kofi Annan (1997-2006):

 

In his Foreward to the book, Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, Annan stated with respect to Article 99, “I myself have never found it necessary to use it.”[14]

 

However, Annan occasionally raised a matter with the Council without formal reference to Article 99. For example, at a Security Council meeting held on 12 March 2002, Annan reported to the Council that in the Middle East “the toll of the dead and wounded, particularly among innocent civilians . . . has risen to levels that can be described, without exaggeration, as appalling”. Stating that he was giving the Council “my assessment of the situation on the ground”, Annan called it “the worst in 10 years” and appealed to the Council “to lend its full authority and influence to the vital cause of peace”. (S/PV.4488) 

 

Annan’s initiative to brief the Council on the Middle East in consultations on 1 April 2002 is referenced above.

 

Further, on 28 June 2003, Annan wrote to the Security Council expressing deep concern over the grave deterioration in the situation in Liberia which, in his view, risked becoming “a major humanitarian catastrophe”. After warning that the consequences of the situation spiralling out of control could impact other countries of the subregion, Annan requested the Security Council “to take urgent action” to authorize deployment of a multinational force under Chapter VII of the Charter. Annan concluded by saying

 

“I regret that this is the second such initiative that I have had to request in recent months. I am again compelled to do so by a grave humanitarian and security situation with massive potential for exacerbating regional instability. Our collective interest and our common humanity demand urgent and decisive action from the Security Council.” (S/2003/678)[15]

 

Ban Ki-moon (2007-2016):

​

Addressing the Security Council on 21 September 2016, Ban Ki-moon repeated messages he had been giving to the Council members, in various settings:

 

"With my strong backing, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura will be ready to present to the parties a draft framework of proposals as a starting point for negotiations for a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political transition. . . . I have asked the Special Envoy to work intensively toward convening formal negotiations as soon as possible. I call on the Security Council to fully support the Special Envoy as he proceeds in this manner – with no ifs, ands, or buts. . . .  And I expect all to use their influence with the Syrian parties to make sure they come to talks, ready to genuinely negotiate the core issues of political transition. . . . I reiterate my call on the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. . . . I challenge everyone to use their influence now to restore a cessation of hostilities, enable humanitarian assistance everywhere it is needed, and support the United Nations in charting a political path for the Syrians to negotiate a way out of the hell in which they are trapped. You have now no higher responsibility in your service as members of the United Nations Security Council."  (S/PV.7774)

  

António Guterres (2017-2026):

 

Myanmar (2017)[16]

On 2 September 2017, António Guterres addressed a letter to the Council President concerning the situation in Rakhine, Myanmar (S/2017/753).  The opening sentence of the letter read:

 

“In keeping with my responsibility to engage in preventing the outbreak or escalation of conflict, I take this opportunity to share my deep concern about the security, humanitarian and human rights situation in Rakhine State in Myanmar.”

  

At the time, the letter appeared to be a very carefully worded initiative taken pursuant to Article 99. While Guterres made no explicit reference to Article 99 and did not use exact wording from that Article, he did speak of his “responsibility to engage in preventing the outbreak or escalation of conflict”. This “responsibility” was stated generally, rather than as attributable to a General Assembly or Security Council resolution on a relevant matter, such as “Responsibility to protect”, and the only general mandate the Secretary-General possesses with respect substantively to issues of peace and security is that which is conferred by Article 99.

 

A second factor which suggested that Guterres’s letter came under Article 99 is that it states that “The current situation . . . risks degenerating into a humanitarian catastrophe with implications for peace and security that could continue to expand beyond the borders of Myanmar” (our emphasis). This sentence suggested that in Guterres’s view, the situation in Myanmar risked developing into a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. And it will be recalled that it is “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security” which Article 99 empowers the Secretary-General to “bring to the attention of the Security Council”.

 

Some considered that Guterres himself provided additional support for considering that he acted pursuant to Article 99 when he stated at a press encounter on 5 September 2017, “I have written officially to the President of the Security Council to express my concern and to propose various steps to end the violence and address the underlying causes of the crisis.” (our emphasis)
 

In most cases involving Article 99, a Secretary-General’s aim has been to prompt the Council to convene a meeting to take up a pressing issue. However, because the Council had discussed Myanmar under “Other matters” during closed consultations only days before Guterres sent his letter, and in light of his statement on 5 September, it would seem that Guterres wrote in order to bring to the Council’s attention not so much the need to meet on this matter, as the need to act on it. Along these lines, Guterres concluded his letter by stating

 

“It is important for the international community to send a strong message emphasizing the need for support and constructive cooperation towards a broader political strategy and policy framework that can help to end the vicious cycle in Rakhine. Furthermore, the international community has a responsibility to undertake concerted efforts to prevent further escalation of the crisis. I also urge the members of the Security Council to press for restraint and calm to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, full respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, and the continued presence and safety of the United Nations and partners to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need without disruption.”

 

Finally, because today a number of informal avenues exist for a Secretary-General to bring a matter to the Council’s attention, the decision by Guterres to write an official, published letter to the Council President also argued for this constituting recourse to Article 99.

 

The above points notwithstanding, on 13 September 2017, answering a press question about his Myanmar initiative, Guterres said

 

“I didn't invoke formally Article 99, but what I did was exactly to draw the attention of the Security Council for the situation, and I've done it officially.  And I invoked the regional destabilization — that it is taking place.  I think we sometimes give too much importance to the formalities.  I think the substance is what matters, and I think the substance here was clear.  And I hope that the Security Council will, indeed, have a meaningful discussion.”[17]

 

Gaza (2023)

On 6 December 2023, in a letter to the Council President,[18] Guterres explicitly stated

 

“I am writing under Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations to bring to the attention of the Security Council a matter which, in my opinion, may aggravate existing threats to the maintenance of international peace and security.”

 

He then described in considerable detail the “appalling human suffering, physical destruction and collective trauma across Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory” which had occurred during the eight weeks since the hostilities erupted. Guterres underscored that the situation was “fast deteriorating into a catastrophe with potentially irreversible implications for Palestinians as a whole and for peace and security in the region.” Such an outcome, he asserted,

 

“must be avoided at all costs. I urge the members of the Security Council to press to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. I reiterate my appeal for a humanitarian ceasefire to be declared. This is urgent.”

 

Speaking later that day to the press, the Secretary-General’s Spokesperson explained that Guterres had invoked Article 99 “given the scale of the loss of human life in Gaza and Israel, in such a short amount of time”. He described the use of Article 99 as a “dramatic constitutional move” that Guterres hoped would put more pressure on the Council – and the international community at large – to demand a ceasefire between the warring parties.”[19]

 

Similar to the case of Myanmar described above, the Council had discussed the crisis in the Middle East in closed consultations only two days before Guterres sent his letter, and in formal meetings twice during the prior week. Thus it would again seem that once again Guterres wrote in order to bring to the Council’s attention not so much the need to meet on this matter, as the need to act on it. 

 

On 8 December 2023, two days after receiving the Secretary-General’s letter, the Council held two meetings on the situation in Gaza. At the first meeting, the letter from Guterres was listed as the only sub-item, and during the meeting, many speakers thanked the Secretary-General for his initiative.

 

At the second meeting, Guterres’s letter was not listed as a sub-item. At that meeting, a vote was held on a resolution drafted by the United Arab Emirates to establish a humanitarian ceasefire. While the UAE had begun work on the draft earlier, it was after the Council received Guterres’s letter that the text was circulated to the other Council members for their input. Thirteen Council members voted in favour, while the United Kingdom abstained, but the resolution failed to be adopted owing to a veto by the United States.

 

In the General Assembly’s subsequent “Veto Initiative” meetings, a strikingly large number of Member States referred in highly positive terms to Guterres’s initiative in invoking Article 99.[20] Full support for Guterres’s Article 99 action with regard to Gaza was also expressed in a published letter sent by the five Nordic countries.[21]

 

 

Concluding observations

 

Whenever Secretaries-General use their entitlement under Article 99 to bring a matter to the Security Council’s attention, it entails considerable political risk, both for them and for the Council.

 

For a Secretary-General, invoking Article 99 involves expending considerable political capital, particularly because incumbents have used this modality so infrequently. One risk for a Secretary-General is that they may appear ineffectual if no concrete outcome develops out of their initiative beyond the convening of a formal Council meeting as required under Rule 3.

 

There is also the possibility that a Secretary-General may invite charges of a double standard if invoking Article 99 in connection with one serious crisis, while not doing so with respect to another serious crisis. For example, because the Council had been so regularly seized of the situation in Gaza at the time of Guterres’s letter, there was some unease that he had not also acted under Article 99 with respect to the disastrous conflict in the Sudan, which at that time was not being given the same level of attention by the Council.

 

Moreover, acting under Article 99 may risk appearing redundant. For example, by the time Guterres invoked Article 99 with respect to Gaza, the Council had already held a significant number of meetings and had voted on seven draft resolutions concerning that crisis, albeit with only one having been adopted.

 

Secretaries-General will certainly be aware of these, and other possible risks. Yet it appears that in each of the cases described above, a Secretary-General’s decision to act under Article 99 matured from genuine worry over deteriorating circumstances in a particular conflict.

 

On the side of the Security Council, there is a risk of being viewed in a negative light if the Council fails to act effectively in response to a Secretary-General’s Article 99 appeal, especially when there wide media coverage of that appeal.

 

For the Security Council, an invocation of Article 99 by a Secretary-General also risks being publicly interpreted as veiled criticism by that Secretary-General that the Council has itself not been making sufficient efforts to live up to its Charter-mandated primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

 

For both the Secretaries-General and the Security Council, a recourse to Article 99 brings the glare of wider publicity, which may give added momentum to diplomatic efforts, but may also inhibit the use of quiet diplomacy.

 

Overall, the relatively few times when there has been recourse to Article 99 suggests that despite advocacy for its greater use, it is a tool which Secretaries-Generals have historically employed sparingly, and with caution. Nonetheless, the perceptions of Member States and the public regarding the United Nations may be favourably impacted by judicious resort to Article 99 because this signals greater engagement by Secretaries-General.

 

(This update supplements pages 162 to 165 of the book.)

___________________________

[1] See, for example, Jentleson, Bruce W., “Dear Mr. Guterres, Please Be a Hammarskjoldian Secretary-General”, PassBlue, 19 October 2016.

[2] Under Rule 2 of the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure, the Council President shall call a meeting at the request of any Council member. Under Rule 3, the President shall do the same at the request not only of the Secretary-General, but also at the request of any other Member State, acting under Article 35 of the Charter, or the General Assembly, acting under Article 11 of the Charter.

[3] The book (page 164) notes that some observers have suggested that the “horizon-scanning” and “situational awareness” briefings occasionally given by Secretariat officials during Council consultations or in other private settings come under the “early warning” function of the Secretary-General in the context of his Article 99 powers. Such briefings are not, however, addressed in this article, notably because they are customarily initiated by Council members rather than the Secretariat.

[4] See related article on this website.

[5] The date was mistakenly published in some news sources as 29 March 1976. 

[6] The letter is on file with the UN archives.

[7] Teltsch, Kathleen, “Lebanese Threat Seen by Waldheim”, The New York Times, 31 March 1976, page 13. Rule 3 of the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure provides that “The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council . . . if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.” 

[8] A/32/1(SUPP).

[9] Waldheim, Kurt, In the Eye of the Storm, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1985.

[10] The Scarecrow Press, Lanham MD, 2001, pages 75 and 238. On page 75, Ryan stated, “In April, mere months before his hoped-for reelection, Waldheim courageously attempted to stimulate action by exercising a seldom-used power of the secretary-general. Under article 99 of the charter, the secretary-general can raise any matter deemed to threaten international peace. Waldheim informed the Security Council that further deterioration in the Lebanese situation carried implications extending beyond that country’s boundaries, and he justified his initiative because cease-fire had become an urgent concern.” (our emphasis) On page 238 of his Chronology, Ryan used a different date when he wrote that on 30 March 1976, “Waldheim, acting under Article 99, tells the Security Council that the Lebanese situation may threaten international peace.”

[11] A/42/1(SUPP).

[12] Pilgrimage For Peace: A Secretary-General’s Memoir, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1997, p. 57.

[13] Page 163.

[14] Chesterman, Simon, ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 72.

[15] This letter was brought to our attention by Manuel Fröhlich, Chair of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Department of Political Science, Trier University, Germany.

[16] For additional details, see related article on this website [3-10c]

[17] Press release SG/SM/18676.

[18] S/2023/962.

[19] https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144447

[20] See A/ES-10/PV.45, A/ES-10/PV.46, A/ES-10/PV.47 and A/ES-10/PV.48.

[21] See S/2023/973 dated 9 December 2023 from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

 

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