1 April 2024

Chapter 6:   VOTING

Section 3:   Procedural matters and the "double veto"

Two procedural votes on the agenda during March 2024 raise several contentious issues

On 25 March 2024, the Security Council President (Japan) opened a meeting which had been requested by the Russian Federation to discuss the 25th anniversary of NATO’s bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and its continuing repercussions for the region. Although the campaign related to Kosovo, the Russian delegation requested that the meeting be convened under the general agenda item “Threats to international peace and security”.[1]

As soon as the meeting began, the representative of France took the floor to say that earlier in the month, his delegation and several other Council members had expressed opposition to holding the meeting. He contended that engaging in rhetoric and marking milestones would not further the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Regarding Kosovo, the Council needed to focus on the present and the future. He then called for a procedural vote.

The Russian representative countered that the 1999 NATO bombing campaign continued to have present destabilizing repercussions for the Balkans. He underscored that this was not merely a historical issue, since the situation in Kosovo remained on the Council's agenda.

After several back-and-forth exchanges between the Russian, French and American representatives, the Council President put the provisional agenda for the meeting to a vote. Algeria, China and the Russian Federation voted in favour, while the other twelve Council members abstained. Having fallen short of the required nine votes, the agenda failed to be adopted. This meant that after several Council members took the floor to explain their position on holding the meeting, it was adjourned.

Three days later, on 28 March 2024, the Security Council met upon a Russian request to take up the same matter, this time under the agenda item, “Maintenance of international peace and security.” After statements again by the French, Russian and American representatives, the provisional agenda was put to a vote at the request of France. This time six Council members voted in favour: China, the Russian Federation and the “A3+1” (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Guyana). The other nine Council members abstained. Absent the required number of votes, the agenda failed to be adopted. Several statements were made following the vote and the meeting was then adjourned.

In the back-and-forth exchanges at both meetings, several contradictory interpretations as to Security Council procedure emerged. This article seeks to bring clarity to some of the points raised.

1.  Rule 2 states, “The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council.” Does this mean that if a Council member requests a meeting, the meeting must be held in full?

This is a complex topic which in our book requires 23 pages (193-215) to cover. In brief, it has been the Council’s established practice since its early decades that the President’s authority is limited to opening the requested meeting. Thereafter, should any member formally object and request a procedural vote, the matter must be settled by the Security Council as a whole. The earliest cases of when opposition to holding a meeting led to a procedural vote occurred in 1952 on the situation in Tunisia, and in 1953 on the question of Morocco. In both cases, the vote was on adopting the provisional agenda and after insufficient votes were cast, the meetings did not go forward.

As detailed in a related article on this website, from 2000 to 2022, eleven Council members objected to meetings opened by the President at the request of a Council member, resulting in twelve such procedural votes. Those Council members which, since 2000, have stated an objection at a Council meeting which led to a vote are:

Angola (1): DPRK human rights (2016)

China (8): Zimbabwe (2005); Myanmar (2006 and 2018); DPRK human rights (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017); Syria (2018)

France (3): Ukraine (2019); NATO bombing campaign against FRY (twice in 2024)

Germany (1): Ukraine (2019)

Netherlands (1): Ukraine (2018)

Poland (2): Ukraine (2018 and 2019)

Qatar (1): Myanmar (2006)

Russian Federation (5): Zimbabwe (2005); Myanmar (2018); Syria (2018); Venezuela (2019); Ukraine (2022)

Sweden (1): Ukraine (2018)

United Kingdom (1): Ukraine (2018)

United States (4): Ukraine (2018 and 2019); NATO bombing campaign against FRY (twice in 2024)

While it is customary for an objecting Council member to state the reasons why they contend that a requested meeting should not go forward, the Security Council itself has never established criteria for determining which types of meetings are valid, and which are not. Rather, if objection has been raised, after arguments in favour and against have been voiced, the matter has been left to the conscience of each member participating in the procedural vote.

2.  When objection is made to a meeting going forward, why is the resulting procedural vote over adopting the agenda?

In all of the cases cited above, from the 1950s to those of this millennium, when objection has been made to continuing a meeting, the vote has consistently been on adopting the provisional agenda. The reason for this is that Rule 9 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure makes adoption of the agenda the first order of business at any formal Council meeting. Rule 9 states,

“The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.”

This has consistently been interpreted to mean that until the agenda has been formally adopted, no other business can be conducted and, specifically, no other question can be put to a vote.[2]

Even though the vote to stop a meeting from going forward is customarily on the agenda item, Council members have largely been clear as to why that is the case. At a meeting convened on Syria in 2018, the Russian representative, in asking for a procedural vote, stated

“We have not yet adopted the agenda for today’s meeting. If we had, the meeting would take place. But that has not happened.”

In this millennium, only once has a procedural vote on the agenda related to any question other than objecting to holding the meeting. The exception occurred in 2018 when a proposed sub-item, “Violation of the borders of the Russian Federation” was objected to. This formulation ran counter to a longstanding Council principle that agenda items should not prejudge the nature of a problem, a determination that can only be made through a substantive decision by the Council. In this case, it was clear that the objection was to the agenda itself because after it failed to be adopted and the meeting was adjourned, a new meeting on the same subject went forward under a different agenda item.[3]

It would be possible for those objecting to a meeting to allow the agenda to be adopted and then put forward a motion to adjourn the meeting pursuant to Rule 33.[4] However, those objecting have deemed that it is most efficacious to determine whether or not the meeting will go forward at the earliest moment, which would be adopting the agenda, rather than getting deeper into the meeting before attempting to halt it.

3.  Should a procedural vote ask how many members are in favour, or how many are opposed?

When a specific rule of procedure provides for taking an affirmative decision – i.e., deciding to adopt the agenda, deciding to extend invitations to participate, etc. – these decisions must be taken in accordance with Charter Article 27(2) which reads: “Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.” Accordingly, it must be clear from the vote that at least nine Council members are in favour of taking the proposed decision set out in the relevant rule.

In the case of votes on the agenda, it is evident that if the vote were formulated to ask how many Council members were opposed to the adoption, it would not be possible to definitively ascertain whether the required number supported the adoption in the event there were significant abstentions. It might be established that fewer than nine members were opposed to adopting the agenda, but it could not legally be deduced that at least nine members were in favour of it. It is for this reason that the Council’s unwavering practice on votes on the provisional agenda have been formulated to ask how many members are in favour.

4.  What is the significance of placing a matter on the Council’s Provisional Programme of Work?

It has been clear since the Security Council first began distributing its Provisional Programme of Work to the wider UN membership that this calendar is not binding on the Council. This is explicitly stated in the 1998 presidential note S/1998/354 by which the Council members recommended that each President

“make available to all Member States the calendar setting out the provisional schedule of work, after the completion of the consultations of the whole on the programme of work, in an appropriate form and under his responsibility. The following footnote should be included in the calendar: ‘The schedule is provisional; the actual schedule will be determined by developments.’” (our emphasis)

Therefore the so-called “adoption” of the Programme at the outset of a presidency, and any agreed modifications as a month progresses, impose no legal obligations on the Council to proceed exactly as indicated therein. As was emphasized at the time of the Council VTCs during Covid-19, decisions pursuant to the Provisional Rules of Procedure relating to the conduct of official meetings can be taken only during such meetings, not in any informal discussions.

In particular, while it is customary for the presidency to get the views of all members through their Political Coordinators before making entries on the calendar, this informal network has no legal power to predetermine what will actually be decided at an official meeting. Nor does the entry of meetings on the Programme by the Security Council Affairs Division, acting at the request of a presidency, impart any legal significance.

Overall, it should be well understood that the Provisional Programme of Work is merely a planning tool for Council members, and an informational tool for the wider UN membership and others following the Council’s work. It is not a legal document.

5.  When the President schedules a meeting requested under Rule 2, does this constitute a “ruling”?

As covered in the book (pages 286-287), “rulings” by the Council President, as provided for in Rules 30 and 36 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure, are given only during Council meetings. This is because, as stated above, the Rules apply only to formal meetings. Therefore, when a presidency, responding to a request under Rule 2, schedules a meeting, it is impossible for this to constitute a “ruling” which obligates the other Council members to agree to that meeting. And even if a Council member is initially in favour of a meeting, they are fully entitled to change their position once the meeting actually convenes because until that time, only informal understandings can be reached.

Moreover, it is established practice that “rulings” by the President should be handed down only when relating to a matter about which the Provisional Rules of Procedure are silent, or for which adequate precedent is lacking. In the case of voiced opposition to continuing a meeting, both the rules and the precedent are sufficiently well-established so as to not qualify for “rulings” except in highly unusual circumstances.

Concluding observations

In response to the handling on 25 March 2024 of Russia’s request for the Council to meet over the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, the Russian representative stated that at every Council meeting thereafter, until a better understanding was reached among Council members, his delegation would call for a vote on the agenda. And Russia has done so since that date. Except in the case of that delegation’s second attempt to have the Council meet on the NATO bombing campaign, all of these procedural votes have resulted in unanimous support for adopting each agenda. While these votes have not consumed excessive time, they do highlight the contentiousness of this issue.

More largely, the issues which emerged at the 25 and 28 March 2024 meetings are symptomatic of two broader problems:

First, these problems evidence the worrisome fact that the institutional memories of Security Council members are becoming increasingly contradictory. In all fairness, the Council’s working methods are now so voluminous and complex that it taxes the capacities even of larger delegations to stay current on all of them, especially given the Council’s heavy workload on substance. But the fact that some members now are taking radically different stances on a number of procedural matters leaves each presidency with less clear models of what correct practice is. It also increases the risk that even when conducting fairly routine business, a presidency could become entrapped in an acrimonious dispute among other members.

Second, because the Security Council is presently confronted by several highly divisive substantive issues, the spillover effect that this is having on procedure and working methods may be of long duration. While procedural battles cannot totally derail the substantive work of the Council, they can disrupt the Council’s normal workflow, consume excessive time and energy, and lead to contentious displays in the Chamber which risk further tarnishing the Council’s reputation.

It can be hoped that the exercise in 2024 by the Council’s Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions to extensively review and revise the Council’s presidential notes on working methods may serve as a counterweight. Having all fifteen members participate in this intensive process may help in better aligning views, and engender a recommitment to best practices.

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(This update supplements pages 193-215 and 286-287 of the book.) 

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[1] The agenda item normally used for meetings on Kosovo is “Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)”.

[2] For adopting the agenda when there is no contention, the President merely presents the provisional agenda and then, if there are no comments, announces the agenda has been adopted. This process is so streamlined that observers do not always notice that this procedural decision has been taken.

[3] See Case 10 in the related article on this website. 

[4] In Case No. 21 described in the related article on this website, a vote to adjourn was taken immediately after adoption of the agenda, but this was not because of an objection to the meeting. Rather, all fifteen Council members wished to have the meeting go on record as having been convened, and then following an explanation by the President, all voted for the adjournment until a later date.

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